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INTRODUCTION

In 2004, the Minnesota Supreme Court issued a landmark
decision that preserves the state’s recreational trails and promotes
the multiple use and conversion of inactive rail corridors. In State
1
v. Hess, the court held that certain portions of the Paul Bunyan
State Trail did not revert to the abutting property owners once the
railroad line on which the trail was constructed ceased to be used
2
for railroad purposes. The court concluded that an 1898 deed
conveying land to a railroad company “for Right of Way and for
Railway purposes” conveyed a fee simple determinable rather than
3
an easement and that the state’s Marketable Title Act (MTA)
4
extinguished the reversionary right. In turning back the property
owners’ claims, the court reaffirmed its longstanding approach that
the intent of the grantor determines the nature and scope of the
interest conveyed and refused to create a presumption that a
conveyance to a railroad is an easement rather than a defeasible
fee. Hess reassures the state that it has good title to other corridors
previously acquired from railroads and stems the tide of property
owners’ claims that threaten the state’s contiguous trail system.
Hess, however, leaves for another day the question of whether
recreational trail use is within the scope of an easement for railroad
purposes under the shifting public use doctrine articulated in
5
Washington Wildlife Preservation, Inc. v. Minnesota, the nation’s
seminal case addressing this issue.
This article assesses the significance of Hess for Minnesota’s
recreational trail system and the conversion of rails to trails. Part II
describes the legal context within which Hess was decided, with
particular emphasis on the methodology of constructing ancient
6
deeds to railroads and the public policy underlying the MTA. Part
III sets forth the facts giving rise to the Hess decision and details the
approach adopted by the court of appeals—an approach which, if
affirmed by the supreme court, would have facilitated a parcel by
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

684 N.W.2d 414 (Minn. 2004).
Id. at 427.
MINN. STAT. § 541.023 (2002).
Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 426-27.
329 N.W.2d 543 (Minn. 1983).
See infra Part II.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss3/12

2

Wolpert: Preserving and Promoting Minnesota’s Recreational Trails: State v
12WOLPERT.DOC

2005]

3/13/2005 4:27:27 PM

PRESERVING AND PROMOTING TRAILS

1135

parcel attack on the state’s ownership of its recreational trails and
potentially limited the application of the shifting public use
7
doctrine established in Washington Wildlife. Part IV discusses the
supreme court’s analysis of the issues, its interpretative
8
methodology, and the normative justification of its approach. Part
V concludes that Hess establishes a strong legal and policy
foundation for the past and future conversion of rail corridors into
recreational trails, promotes the public interest, and avoids
plunging the state into a costly parcel by parcel battle to save its
9
contiguous recreational trail system.
II. THE LEGAL CONTEXT WITHIN WHICH HESS WAS DECIDED
The question before the Minnesota Supreme Court in State v.
Hess was a technical question of deed construction: whether an
1898 deed to a railroad company conveyed a fee simple
10
determinable or an easement. A fee simple determinable is an
ownership interest in real property subject to the limitation that the
property reverts to the grantor upon the occurrence of a specified
11
event. By contrast, an easement is a right to the use or enjoyment
of the land rather than an ownership interest in the property
12
itself.
In evaluating the nature of the property interest conveyed by
the 1898 deed, the supreme court had the opportunity to create a
rule of construction that a deed to a railroad was an easement
rather than a defeasible fee. This was the course taken by the court
13
of appeals. Had the supreme court adopted such an approach, it
would have opened the door to countless quiet title suits by
landowners adjacent to inactive rail corridors. Such an approach
also would have been in tension with the shifting public use
doctrine and would have facilitated ownership challenges of the
state’s efforts to build a system of recreational trails on former rail
corridors. Consequently, State v. Hess was a highly salient case with

7. See infra Part III.
8. See infra Part IV.
9. See infra Part V.
10. State v. Hess, 684 N.W.2d 414, 420 (Minn. 2004).
11. Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 102 v. Walter, 243 Minn. 159, 161-63, 66 N.W.2d
881, 883-84 (1954).
12. Id.
13. State ex rel Dept. of Nat’l Resources v. Hess, 665 N.W.2d 560, 566 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2003).
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significance extending far beyond the rights of the individual
property owners involved in the dispute over the Paul Bunyan State
Trail.
This section discusses the legal context within which Hess was
decided and sets the stage for understanding what was at stake in
Hess. Part A explains the methodology of construing ancient deeds
14
to railroads.
Part B discusses the influence of the history of
railroad acquisition practices on the methodology of deed
15
construction.
Part C explains Minnesota’s prior case law
regarding the interpretation of conveyances to railroad
16
companies. Part D sets forth the provisions of the MTA, the
statute’s underlying public policy goals, and how those goals might
17
inform the court’s choice of interpretative methodology in Hess.
A. The Methodology of Deed Construction
The nature and scope of the property rights granted to
railroads by deeds executed in the 1800s is a recurring question in
18
Historically, railroads could
modern property jurisprudence.
acquire a fee simple absolute, a fee simple subject to a condition
subsequent, a fee simple determinable, a perpetual or unlimited
19
easement, a limited or conditional easement, or a license.
Evaluating the precise nature of the interest conveyed by a
particular deed, however, is a difficult task. Ancient deeds are
often ambiguous and may contain language appearing to grant
20
both a fee estate and an easement. Discerning the parties’ intent
is difficult because the parties are unavailable and there is limited,
21
if any, extrinsic evidence regarding intent. In addition, the nature
of the land at issue may be different than it was at the time the
22
deed was executed.
Further, state property laws may have
different requirements governing the methodology of deed
14. See infra Part II.A.
15. See infra Part II.B.
16. See infra Part II.C.
17. See infra Part II.D.
18. See A.E. Korpela, Annotation, Deed To Railroad Company as Conveying Fee or
Easement, 6 A.L.R.3d 973, § 3 (1966); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY:
SERVITUDES § 2.2 (2000).
19. See Korpela, supra note 18; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES
§ 2.2 (2000).
20. Korpela, supra note 18.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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23

interpretation. For all these reasons, there is considerable conflict
in the way courts construe the nature and scope of the property
interest conveyed to a railroad by deeds containing language
referring to a “right-of-way” and/or the purpose of the
24
conveyance.
Despite the conflicting outcomes reached by the courts, the
polestar of deed interpretation is to effectuate the intent of the
parties as expressed in the deed and in light of the surrounding
25
circumstances. When a deed is ambiguous on the issue of intent,
a court may consider parol evidence to determine the parties’
26
intent. The factors typically examined by the courts in evaluating
the intent of the parties include: (1) the stated purpose of the
grant, (2) whether the grantor reserved the right to use any of the
land at issue, (3) the amount of consideration, (4) subsequent
deeds identifying the nature of the original grant, and (5) the
27
release of dower rights.
When the grant is described as a “right of way,” the intent of
the parties is unclear regarding the nature of the grant because, as
the United States Supreme Court has recognized, the term can
refer to both (1) “a right of passage over any tract” or (2) the “land
which railroad companies take upon which to construct their road28
bed.” Accordingly, the use of the term “right of way” does not

23. Jeffrey M. Heftman, Note, Railroad Right-of-Way Easements, Utility
Apportionments, and Shifting Technological Realities, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1401, 1407
(2002) (“The varying histories of state property law doctrine and the absence of
federal preemption in the field account, in part, for the current diversity of
treatment of such cases.”).
24. Id.
25. State v. Hess, 684 N.W.2d 414, 423 (Minn. 2004).
26. Id.; see also Farnes v. Lane, 281 Minn. 222, 225-26 & n.7, 161 N.W.2d 297,
300 & n.7 (1968); 15 DUNNELL MINN. DIGEST, Deeds § 1.11 (4th ed. 1992); Korpela,
supra note 18.
27. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 423-26.
28. Id. at 424 (citing Joy v. City of St. Louis, 138 U.S. 1, 44 (1891); Bosell v.
Rannestad, 226 Minn. 413, 418, 33 N.W.2d 40, 43-44 (1948)). Other courts have
recognized the two meanings of “right of way” and have concluded that the mere
presence of the term “right of way” in a deed does not by itself indicate an intent
to convey an easement. See, e.g., King County v. Rasmussen, 299 F.3d 1077, 1085
(9th Cir. 2002); Clark v. CSX Transp., Inc., 737 N.E.2d 752, 758 (Ind. Ct. App.
2000); Brown v. State, 924 P.2d 908, 914 (Wash. 1996). In addition, the fact that
the term “right of way” is used in the habendum clause does not mean that an
easement was conveyed. In general, the habendum clause may explain, enlarge,
or qualify, but it cannot contradict or defeat the estate granted in the granting
clause. New York Indians v. United States, 170 U.S. 1, 20 (1898); Clark, 737 N.E.2d
at 758.
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29

necessarily mean that the conveyance is an easement. When the
grantor reserves the right to use any of the land at issue, such
reservation is an indicator that the parties intended to convey an
30
easement.
If a deed is ambiguous, the courts will look to
subsequent deeds describing the conveyance at issue to discern the
31
parties’ intent. Because an easement is not title to the land and
can be conveyed without the relinquishment of the wife’s dower
rights, the release of dower rights may indicate that the parties
32
intended to grant a fee estate.
Some courts view nominal consideration as an indicator that
the parties intended to convey an easement rather than a fee
simple determinable. When the record does not establish the
consideration typically paid for easements as opposed to fee simple
estates, it cannot be ascertained whether the nominal consideration
33
represented the value of an easement or a defeasible fee. In fact,
in some cases, railroads often paid significant amounts of money
34
In other cases, railroads
for both easements and fee estates.
sometimes paid nothing for fee estates because of the benefits to
the grantor in having access to the railroad. The Minnesota
Supreme Court has observed that the difference in value of an
35
easement and a fee simple determinable is nominal because
railroad easements have the “substantiality of the fee,” in that the
railroad has exclusive possession and control of the property
36
subject only to the owner’s servient interest.
Accordingly,
nominal consideration does not necessarily indicate that the parties
37
intended to convey an easement rather than a defeasible fee.

29. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 424.
30. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 2.2 (2000).
31. See, e.g., Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 424.
32. Id. at 425; see also Brewer & Taylor Co. v. Wall, 769 S.W.2d 753, 755 (Ark.
1989); Coleman v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 745 S.W.2d 622, 637 (Ark. 1988); Elton
Schmidt & Sons Farm Co. v. Kneib, 507 N.W.2d 305, 309 (Neb. Ct. App. 1993).
But see Hawk v. Rice, 325 N.W.2d 97, 100 (Iowa 1982) (holding that granting
clause clearly indicated conveyance of easement despite the release of dower in
the deed).
33. King County, 299 F.3d at 1085 n.8.
34. Roeder Co. v. K & E Moving & Storage Co., 4 P.3d 839, 842-43 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2000).
35. Chi. Great W. Ry. Co. v. Zahner, 145 Minn. 312, 316-17, 177 N.W. 350,
351-52 (1920).
36. Id.
37. See King County, 299 F.3d at 1084 & n.8; Brown v. State, 924 P.2d 908, 914
(Wash. 1996); Roeder, 4 P.3d at 842.
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B. The Influence of Railroad Acquisition Practices on Deed Construction
Although the history of railroad acquisition practices is beyond
38
the scope of this article, how the courts construe the nature and
scope of a railroad’s property interest must be understood against
the backdrop of this history. During the heyday of railroad
development and expansion, the railroads received tremendous
federal and state government land grants, subsidies, and eminent
39
domain powers to establish rail corridors. Landowners, eager to
obtain the benefits of being connected to a rail corridor and higher
land values, would often make an outright donation of land to the
40
railroad. In other cases, landowners would sell the land, or an
41
interest in the land, to the railroad. If a landowner refused to give
up land necessary to complete a line, eminent domain powers were
42
used to acquire the land. Often the land was being surveyed and
the corridor was being constructed before land acquisition was
43
finalized.
Some rail lines were in operation years before land
44
Occasionally, no deed conveyed the
acquisition was finalized.
property and the railroad’s interest was acquired through
prescription.
The haste and recklessness of this expansion ended in the
1870s as the great rewards promised by the railroads failed to
materialize, the abusive practices of the railroads were exposed,
and huge land grants given to the railroads were increasingly
45
viewed as government pork at the expense of the taxpayers. The
backlash against the railroads from the 1880s to the 1920s resulted
in many states reducing the railroads’ eminent domain powers,
legislatively prohibiting railroads from acquiring land in fee simple,
and legislatively mandating the abandonment of railroad
38. For further information regarding the history of railroad land acquisition,
see Danaya C. Wright & Jeffrey M. Hester, Pipes, Wires, and Bicycles: Rails-to-Trails,
Utility Licenses, and the Shifting Scope of Railroad Easements from the Nineteenth to the
Twenty-First Centuries, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 351 (2000); Heftman, supra note 23; Emily
Drumm, Note, Addressing the Flaws of the Rails-to-Trails Act, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
158 (1999); Gregg H. Hirakawa, Comment, Preserving Transportation Corridors for the
Future: Another Look at Railroad Deeds in Washington State, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 481
(2001).
39. Wright & Hester, supra note 38, at 366-78.
40. Id. at 369-70.
41. Id. at 370.
42. Id. at 370-71.
43. Id. at 371.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 374.
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easements when a railroad did not continue to operate and
46
maintain its corridors.
The public sentiment against the railroads also affected how
courts interpreted deeds to railroad companies. Many courts,
reflecting this anti-railroad animus, abandoned the practice of
making fine distinctions among various types of property rights the
47
railroads could acquire. Instead, courts now resolved ambiguities
48
and presumptions in deeds in favor of grantor landowners. The
result, as Wright and Hester explain, was that the courts imposed a
binary structure on railroad title disputes permitting a railroad to
have either a fee simple absolute or an easement:
The result was that many courts simply imposed a
binary structure on railroad title disputes: either the
railroad acquired fee simple absolute title, allowing it
to do virtually anything it wanted with its land, even if it
had discontinued services and abandoned certain
parcels, or the railroad acquired merely an easement
or a right-of-way over the original landowner’s land,
49
extinguishable under principles of abandonment.
The methodology of deed construction and common law property
doctrines and presumptions reflected this binary structure.
C. Minnesota’s Methodology of Deed Interpretation on the Eve of Hess
On the eve of Hess, the Minnesota Supreme Court had clearly
established that in determining the nature and scope of a
conveyance, one examines the intent of the grantor, as expressed
50
in the deed and in light of the surrounding circumstances.
Whether the court had established a binary structure of deed
interpretation, however, was another matter. Before Hess, the
Minnesota Supreme Court had decided three cases addressing the
nature of a right-of-way conveyance to a railroad company—
51
Chambers v. Great Northern Power Co., Norton v. Duluth Transfer

46. Id.
47. Id. at 377.
48. Id. at 374-75.
49. Id. at 377.
50. Chi. Great W. Ry. Co. v. Zahner, 145 Minn. 312, 313-14, 177 N.W. 350,
350 (1920); Norton v. Duluth Transfer Ry. Co., 129 Minn. 126, 130-31, 151 N.W.
907, 907-08 (1915).
51. 100 Minn. 214, 110 N.W. 1128 (1907).
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53

Railway Co., and Chicago Great Western Railway Co. v. Zahner. In
these cases, the court did not distinguish between an easement and
a fee simple determinable, suggesting that (1) the cases themselves
failed to raise the distinction between the two property interests,
(2) it was not necessary for the court to make a distinction between
the two property interests, or (3) the court had impliedly adopted a
binary approach to deed construction.
Decided in 1907, Chambers addressed the question of whether
title to land acquired in condemnation proceedings for right of way
purposes was an easement or a fee simple determinable and held
that the conveyance was an easement rather than a fee simple
54
absolute. In explaining its decision, the Chambers court stated that
the distinction between an easement and a fee simple determinable
was immaterial to the resolution of the case because the intent of
the grantor to create reversionary rights would be fulfilled
regardless of whether the deed conveyed an easement or a
55
defeasible fee.
In Norton, decided in 1915, the railroad company charged with
having abandoned an easement defended itself on the grounds
that it was not bound by use limitations because it had acquired a
56
fee simple absolute. “[T]he appellants argued that the deed at
issue ‘conveyed an absolute fee title limited only as to use, namely,
railroad right of way purposes, and that a failure to use it for that
purpose or at all would not terminate the absolute title thus
57
granted.’” In Norton, the court held that the conveyance of a strip
of land to a railroad company for a right of way conveyed an
easement rather than an absolute title for which the appellants
58
argued. The Norton court did not address the question of whether
59
the deed constituted a fee simple determinable.
Zahner addressed the question of whether the grantors
conveyed an easement or a fee estate. In that 1920 case, the
railroad company argued that it had acquired the land in fee and
that the successor in title to the grantor had no right of access to a

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
908).
58.
59.

129 Minn. 126, 151 N.W. 907 (1915).
145 Minn. 312, 177 N.W. 350 (1920).
Chambers, 100 Minn. at 219, 110 N.W. at 1129-30.
Id.
Norton, 129 Minn. at 129, 151 N.W. at 908.
Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 420 (citing Norton, 129 Minn. at 129, 151 N.W. at
Id. (quoting Norton, 129 Minn. at 129, 151 N.W. at 908).
Id.
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60

right of way that was conveyed outright in the granting clause. As
in Norton, the Zahner court focused on the issue of reversionary
rights in justifying its holding and stated that “[w]ithin the
principles of our holdings there was no intent to grant a fee, but an
intent to grant a railroad right of way easement, which would revert
61
upon abandonment.”
Based on Chambers, Zahner, and Norton, the court in Hess could
have endorsed a binary approach to deed construction and created
a presumption that a deed to a railroad was an easement rather
than a defeasible fee. Alternatively, the court could distinguish
these three cases from Hess on the grounds that they did not
address or need to address the distinction between an easement
and a defeasible fee. The court’s choice between these alternatives
would be influenced by the Marketable Title Act.
D. The Marketable Title Act
Chambers, Norton, and Zahner were decided before Minnesota’s
MTA was enacted. The MTA promotes finality of conveyances and
settled expectations. It also makes the distinction between an
easement and a fee simple determinable material because an
interest in fee simple determinable may be subject to the MTA’s
62
conclusive presumption of abandonment.
The stated purpose of the MTA is to prevent restrictions on
uses that have not been reasserted as a matter of record within the
63
last forty years from “fetter[ing] the marketability of real estate.”
It provides that no action affecting the possession or title of real
estate may be commenced against a claim of title which has been of
record for at least forty years unless the adverse claimant has
recorded a notice of the adverse claim within that forty-year
64
period. The MTA states, in part:
As against a claim of title based upon a source of title,
which source has then been of record at least 40 years, no
action affecting the possession or title of any real estate
shall be commenced . . . to enforce any right, claim,
interest, incumbrance, or lien founded upon any
60. Chicago Great W. Ry. Co. v. Zahner, 145 Minn. 312, 312, 177 N.W. 350,
350 (1920).
61. Id. at 314, 177 N.W. at 350.
62. MINN. STAT. § 541.023, subd. 5 (2002).
63. Id.
64. Id., subd. 1.
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instrument, event or transaction which was executed or
occurred more than 40 years prior to the commencement
of such action, unless within 40 years after such execution
or occurrence there has been recorded . . . a notice . . .
setting forth the name of the claimant, a description of
the real estate affected and of the instrument, event or
transaction on which such claim is founded, and stating
whether the right, claim, interest, incumbrance, or lien is
65
mature or immature.
III. THE FACTUAL BASIS OF THE PROPERTY OWNERS’ CLAIMS IN
STATE V. HESS
A. The 1898 Deed
On April 1, 1898, Thomas B. Walker and his wife Harriet G.
Walker, and W.T. Joyce and his wife Clotilde G. Joyce, conveyed a
portion of their land to the Brainerd and Northern Minnesota
66
Railway Company. The granting clause of the handwritten deed
states that the grantors,
for and in consideration of the sum of One Dollar ($1.00)
to them in hand paid by the Brainerd and Northern
Minnesota Railway Company . . . do hereby grant, bargain,
sell and convey unto the said company, its successors and
assigns, a strip, belt or piece of land, one hundred feet,
wide, extending across the following lands in Cass and
Hubbard Counties, State of Minnesota, described as
67
follows to wit . . . .
Following the legal description of the lands conveyed, the
limiting clause of the deed states: “Provided that this Grant or
Conveyance shall continue in force so long as the said strips of land
shall be used for Right of Way and for Railway purposes; but to
cease and terminate if the Railway is removed from the said
68
strips.”
In 1901, the Burlington Northern Railroad Company (BNRC)
purchased the subject property and thus became the successor in
title to the Brainerd and Northern Minnesota Railway Company’s

65. Id.
66. State v. Hess, 684 N.W.2d 414, 417 (Minn. 2004).
67. Brief of the State of Minnesota, through its Department of Natural
Resources at Appendix A31, Hess, 684 N.W.2d 414.
68. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 417.
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69

interest. BNRC used the corridor for a railroad line for the next
70
84 years.
B. BNRC’s Sale of the Corridor to the State
The Interstate Commerce Commission Act of 1920 gives the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) plenary authority to
71
regulate interstate rail service. In general, a railroad subject to
the jurisdiction of the ICC may only abandon a line if it obtains
72
approval of the ICC. In determining whether to issue a certificate
of abandonment, the ICC weighs the “public inconvenience and
necessity” of the railway service against the financial cost to the
73
railroad of operating an unprofitable corridor.
In 1985, BNRC received a certificate of abandonment from the
74
ICC allowing discontinued service on the rail line. During the
abandonment proceeding, the Minnesota Department of
Transportation (MnDOT) petitioned the ICC for a 120-day “public
use condition” in order to negotiate for the acquisition and
75
placement of part of the rail line in the State Rail Bank Program.
The ICC granted the certificate of abandonment, finding that
“portions of the right-of-way are suitable for other public
76
purposes.”
The ICC, however, denied MnDOT’s petition to
declare part of the rail corridor “suitable for public use for
77
acquisition as part of the State Rail Bank Program.” In doing so,
the ICC supported its decision with the reasoning that “a ‘public
use’ did not include keeping the track and materials intact for
future rail freight use and that MnDOT had failed to submit the
78
required information for seeking a public use condition.”
After the ICC granted BNRC’s request for abandonment of
portions of the rail line, BNRC unsuccessfully attempted to sell its
79
corridor for use as a tourist railway line. In 1986 or 1987, BNRC
69. Id. at 417-18.
70. Id. at 418.
71. Glosemeyer v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co., 685 F. Supp. 1108, 1113
(E.D. Mo. 1988).
72. 49 U.S.C. §§ 10903, 10904 (Supp. 1991); 49 C.F.R. § 1152.50 (1990).
73. Id.; Vieux v. E. Bay Reg’l Park Dist., 906 F.2d 1330, 1339 (9th Cir. 1990).
74. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 418.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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removed the tracks, bridges, and ties from the corridor. In 1988,
the Minnesota Legislature authorized the purchase of part of the
corridor by the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) for the
81
creation of the Paul Bunyan State Trail. BNRC then conveyed the
82
corridor by quitclaim deed to the DNR for $1.526 million. In
83
December 1991, the DNR opened the Trail for public use. The
Trail extends about ninety miles from Baxter to Bemidji,
Minnesota, and is used by tourists for hiking, biking, horseback
84
riding, and snowmobiling.
C. The Abutting Property Owners
The land adjoining the rail corridor changed hands a number
of times. In 1977, Brian and Amelia Sandberg acquired a parcel of
land bordering the railroad corridor; the railroad line was still
85
operational when the acquisition occurred. In 1993 and 1995, the
Sandbergs acquired two additional parcels, one of which was
86
bisected by the Trail, while the other bordered it. At the time of
87
these acquisitions, the Trail was open for public use. In 1992,
approximately one year after the Trail opened, Duwayne Hess
acquired a parcel that is partially adjacent to and partially bisected
88
by the Trail.
Each of these landowners viewed themselves as
successors-in-interest to the Walkers and the Joyces, the original
grantors of the railroad right-of-way.
In 1998, the Sandbergs and Hess blockaded portions of the
89
Trail where it crossed their individual properties. The blockades
prevented the public from using the Trail, forcing trail users to
travel onto private property to get back onto the Trail, and
necessitating a temporary re-routing of the Trail using county road
90
embankments.
The DNR received numerous complaints from
Trail users expressing frustration with having to go around the
80. Id.
81. Id. The Paul Bunyan State Trail purchase was authorized in Heartland
and Paul Bunyan Trails Act, 1988 Minn. Laws ch. 679.
82. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 418.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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91

blockaded portions of the Trail. In 2002, the Sandbergs began to
use the Trail as a private driveway to access their property even
92
though there were alternative access routes available.
The
Sandbergs also excavated and removed topsoil, trees, and bushes
93
and stockpiled topsoil on the Trail.
D. Quiet Title Action
In 2002, the DNR initiated a quiet title action seeking a
declaration that the DNR owned the portions of the Trail being
94
blockaded by the Sandbergs and Hess. The district court issued a
temporary injunction “prohibiting the Sandbergs from driving
vehicles on the [T]rail, digging in the [Trail], and using the [T]rail
95
as a driveway.”
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the
district court determined that the DNR owned a fee simple interest
96
in the disputed property in question. The district court found
that the 1898 deed conveyed a fee simple determinable rather than
an easement and that the state’s MTA extinguished the
97
reversionary right.
E. The Court of Appeals’ Approach
The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the railroad
obtained an easement that had been subsequently abandoned by
the railroad and that the Sandbergs and Hess owned the land in
98
The court began its analysis by stating that it would
fee.
determine the intent of the parties in addressing the question of
99
what property interest the 1898 deed conveyed. The court,
however, did not proceed to examine the language in the deed and
explain why the language indicated that the parties intended to
100
grant an easement.
Instead, it examined Zahner and Norton and
then reasoned that because the supreme court had never held that
a conveyance to a railroad was a fee interest, the intent of the
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
State v. Hess, 665 N.W.2d 560, 566 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 563.
Id. at 564.
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101

parties to the 1898 deed must have been to grant an easement.
The court of appeals thus applied a presumption that a grant
to a railroad is always an easement rather than a defeasible fee.
The court supported this in the following manner: (1) “[w]e have
found no Minnesota appellate cases in which right-of-way deeds to
railroads have been construed to convey fee title;” (2) “[t]he
primary purpose of such deeds has, rather, been determined to
provide a right-of-way for use by the railroad during the period of
time that the railway operated on the land subject to the
conveyance;” and (3) “[w]e therefore conclude that the limiting
language in the 1898 deed . . . reflects the parties’ intent that the
deed convey an easement, rather than a fee simple determinable
102
. . . .”
The court of appeals went on to find that the railroad
abandoned the easement in 1986 or 1987 when it ceased railroad
operations and removed its tracks from the corridor following
103
receipt of the certificate of abandonment from the ICC.
The
court determined that there were three affirmative acts by the
railroad that indicated the railroad’s intent to abandon its property
interest: (1) the railroad sought and received a certificate of
abandonment from the ICC in 1985 permitting discontinued
service on the rail line between Brainerd and Bemidji; (2) the
railroad tried unsuccessfully to sell the property for a tourist line;
104
and (3) the railroad removed the tracks in 1986 or 1987.
The
court also stated that its decision was influenced by the fact that the
ICC denied MnDOT’s request that the property be deemed
suitable for public use for acquisition as part of the State Rail Bank
105
Program. Based on these findings, the court determined that the
Sandbergs and Hess succeeded as fee owners to the property
106
before the railroad conveyed the land to the State. Although the
court’s analysis of the abandonment and the shifting public use
107
issues is questionable, it was never addressed by the Minnesota

101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 566.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. The court of appeals likely erred in its analysis of the abandonment
issue. Abandonment is an intent to give up the property right and is determined
by evidence of an intent to abandon. United Parking Stations, Inc. v. Calvary
Temple, 257 Minn. 273, 278, 101 N.W.2d 208, 212 (1960). Mere nonuse does not
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indicate an intent to abandon the property right: abandonment is shown by acts
and conduct “clearly inconsistent with an intention to continue the use of the
property for the purposes for which it was acquired.” Norton v. Duluth Transfer
Ry. Co., 129 Minn. 126, 132, 151 N.W. 907, 909 (1915).
There are three reasons why the court of appeals’ analysis of the
abandonment issue is flawed. First, the court misinterpreted the significance of an
ICC certificate of abandonment and equated an intent to discontinue railroad
service with an intent to abandon the property right. The court’s confusion stems
from the fact that the word “abandonment” has a different meaning in two
disparate contexts.
For purposes of federal regulation of railroads,
“abandonment” refers to the discontinuance of rail service on a particular line, as
approved by the ICC. For purposes of state law, “abandonment” refers to the
relinquishment or termination of the property rights held under an easement.
ICC approval of the discontinuance of rail service is not equivalent to
relinquishment of the railroad’s property rights in the easement. A railroad
subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC may only abandon a line if it obtains the
approval of the ICC. 49 U.S.C. §§ 10903, 10904 (Supp. 1991); 49 C.F.R. § 1152.50
(1990). In determining whether to issue a certificate of abandonment, the ICC
weighs the “public convenience and necessity” of the railway service against the
financial cost to the railroad of operating an unprofitable corridor. 49 U.S.C. §
10903 (Supp. 1991); Vieux v. E. Bay Reg’l Park Dist., 906 F.2d 1330, 1337 (9th Cir.
1990). The ICC, however, issues only permission to discontinue service; an ICC
certificate does not require the railroad to discontinue service. Vieux, 906 F.2d at
1339. Accordingly, when the ICC grants a certificate of abandonment, it is simply
determining that federal interstate commerce requirements do not necessitate
current common carrier freight rail service on a line and is not evaluating the
railroad’s property interest in the corridor or whether a line is abandoned for
purposes of state property law. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Kmezich, 48 F.3d 1047,
1051 (8th Cir. 1995); Vieux, 906 F.2d at 1339; Chevy Chase Land Co. v. United
States, 733 A.2d 1055, 1085-86 (D. Md. 1999); Hennick v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co.,
269 S.W.2d 646, 651 (Mont. 1954); Barney v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 490 N.W.2d
726, 731 (S.D. 1992). Further, the ICC’s action on MnDOT’s request is irrelevant
to the issue of state law abandonment under the facts of this case. When a party
requests that a corridor be designated suitable for other public use, and the ICC
grants such a request, the sole consequence under federal law is that the railroad
is barred from selling or disposing of the property during the 180-day period. 49
U.S.C. § 10906 (Supp. 1982). For these reasons, the court of appeals was incorrect
in viewing the certificate of abandonment and the denial of MnDOT’s request as
indicators of abandonment.
Second, the court of appeals considered the railroad’s attempted sale for
a tourist line and the removal of the tracks as indicators of abandonment in direct
contravention to existing precedent. See Wash. Wildlife Pres., Inc. v. Minnesota,
329 N.W.2d 543, 547 (Minn. 1983) (abandonment of a corridor as a railroad right
of way does not effect abandonment of the easement; removal of the tracks and
termination of service are consistent with use of the railroad bed as a public
recreational trail); Crolley v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co., 30 Minn. 541, 545,
16 N.W. 422, 424 (1883) (sale of easement is not equivalent to an abandonment
when the sale is for continued use of the property as a right of way).
Third, the court of appeals misapplied the shifting public use doctrine.
Under Minnesota’s shifting public use doctrine, recreational trail use is
compatible and consistent with an easement’s prior use as a rail line and imposes
no additional burden on the servient estate. Wash. Wildlife, 329 N.W.2d at 545-46.
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Supreme Court because that court determined that the grantors

In Washington Wildlife, thirteen of the fourteen deeds at issue conveyed fee simple
absolute estates and one deed created an easement. The court analyzed whether
the new use as a recreational trail was within the scope of the prior use. Id. at 54748. Because the deeds contained no limiting language, the supreme court had to
assume for purposes of its analysis of the abandonment question that the deeds
conveyed easements and also to assume what limiting language the deeds
contained. Wash. Wildlife, 329 N.W.2d at 546. The court framed the question
based on the assumption that the deeds contained language limiting use of the
land for railroad purposes based on the fact that the land had been used for
railroad purposes. Id. at 547. The court, however, emphasized that it was only
assuming that the deeds conveyed easements, and was careful to indicate that the
deeds did not appear to be easements because they did not contain any limiting
language. Id. at 546. The court stated:
It is assumed that the deeds conveyed only an easement. Significantly,
however, none of the deeds expressly limit the easement to railroad
purposes, provide that the interest conveyed terminates if use for railroad
purposes ceases, or provide that the easement would exist only for so
long as the right-of-way was used for railroad purposes. While the
grantors were undoubtedly aware that a railroad would be constructed on
the land, none of the deeds limit the use to railroad purposes.
Id.
The court of appeals in Hess, however, seized upon the above passage in
Washington Wildlife and used that language to distinguish the 1898 deed from the
Washington Wildlife deeds. Hess, 665 N.W.2d at 565-66. The court reasoned that
the 1898 deed was unlike the deeds at issue in Washington Wildlife because the 1898
deed contained language limiting the use of the land to railroad purposes until
removal of the railway from the strips, while the Washington Wildlife deeds did not.
Id. However, this passage relied on by the court of appeals in Hess does not
indicate that the supreme court in Washington Wildlife was basing its conclusion
regarding abandonment on the fact that the deeds did not contain limiting
language. The deeds did not contain limiting language because they conveyed fee
estates and the supreme court had to assume for purposes of analysis that the
deeds did contain language limiting land use to railroad purposes. Accordingly,
the court of appeals had no basis for distinguishing the 1898 deed from the
Washington Wildlife deeds. The 1898 deed expressly limits use to railroad purposes
and the deeds at issue in Washington Wildlife were assumed to contain language
limiting use to railroad purposes. Indeed, there would have been no need for the
court in Washington Wildlife to address the question whether the scope of the
easements could accommodate a shift in public use unless the easements were
assumed to be specifically limited to railroad use. If it were assumed that the
easements were broad transportation easements, the supreme court would not
have needed to resort to the shifting public use doctrine because trail use would
be considered within the scope of such an easement. Thus, the 1898 deed
contains the same limiting language as assumed in the Washington Wildlife deeds.
Under Washington Wildlife, a railroad does not abandon a public easement if the
property is transformed to meet changing needs but retains some character of the
original easement. Wash. Wildlife, 329 N.W.2d at 547. Accordingly, the Paul
Bunyan State Trail, a recreational trail, is compatible and consistent with the
corridor’s prior use as a rail line and the court of appeals in Hess erred in
concluding otherwise.
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conveyed a fee estate to the railroad rather than an easement.
IV. THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT’S ANALYSIS
The main question before the supreme court was whether the
1898 deed to the railroad company conveyed a fee simple
108
determinable or an easement.
The court began its analysis by
examining prior case law addressing the nature and scope of a
109
conveyance to a railroad.
The court also discussed the MTA, its
underlying policy objectives, and its significance for analyzing the
110
Against the backdrop of previous case law and the
1898 deed.
MTA, the court then analyzed the intent of the parties in the 1898
deed. The court concluded that the language of the deed and
extrinsic evidence indicated that the grantors conveyed a fee
111
simple determinable estate to the railroad.
The court also
concluded that the possibility of reverter was extinguished under
112
the MTA. The court therefore reversed the court of appeals and
held that the district court was correct in granting summary
judgment for the DNR because as a matter of law, the DNR now
113
owned the subject property in fee simple absolute.
A. Conveyances to Railroads: Chambers, Norton, Zahner, and the
MTA
The court identified three cases involving the conveyance of a
114
115
strip of land to a railroad company: Chambers, Norton, and
116
Zahner. Relying on Chambers, the court concluded that Norton and
Zahner “provide[d] limited guidance . . . in determining whether
the interest conveyed by the 1898 Walker/Joyce deed was an
117
easement or a fee simple determinable.”
This conclusion was
crucial to the court’s ultimate holding for several reasons. First, it
swept away the foundations for the court of appeals’ conclusion
that there was a presumption that a conveyance to a railroad was an
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 419-20.
Id. at 420-21.
Id. at 422-23.
Id. at 426-27.
Id. at 426-27.
Id. at 427.
Chambers v. Great N. Power Co., 100 Minn. 214, 110 N.W. 1128 (1907).
Norton v. Duluth Transfer Ry. Co., 129 Minn. 126, 151 N.W. 907 (1915).
Chi. Great W. Ry. Co. v. Zahner, 145 Minn. 312, 177 N.W. 350 (1920).
Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 421.
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easement rather than a defeasible fee. Second, it freed the court
from the binary analytical structure of the nineteenth century and
its underlying anti-railroad animus in a manner consistent with the
public policy objectives of the MTA. Finally, it permitted the court
to evaluate the nature of the interest conveyed to the railroad
company based on its longstanding approach that the intent of the
grantor determines the nature and scope of the property interest
118
conveyed.
In Chambers, the question before the court was whether title to
land acquired in condemnation proceedings for right of way
purposes was an easement or a fee simple determinable. The court
held that the conveyance was an easement rather than a fee simple
119
absolute. In explaining its decision, however, the Chambers court
stated that the distinction between an easement and a fee simple
determinable was immaterial to the resolution of the case because
the intent of the grantor to create reversionary rights would be
fulfilled regardless of whether the deed conveyed an easement or a
120
defeasible fee. The court stated:
It . . . becomes immaterial whether the title [to a railroad
right of way] amounted to a mere easement, or a qualified
or terminable fee. Whatever the nature of the title, it
would terminate whenever the company failed to perform
the very function which it was created to perform, viz.,
121
operate a railroad over the land.
The Hess court quoted the above passage from Chambers and
observed that the Chambers court “recognized . . . that the
distinction between an easement and a fee simple determinable
122
was immaterial to the resolution of the case”
because “the
interests at issue would have reverted to the grantors upon the
123
termination of their use regardless of the distinction.” The court
in Hess also acknowledged that courts in the nineteenth century
often failed to make fine distinctions among the various property
rights that the railroads could acquire because anti-railroad animus
caused many courts to hold that all ambiguities in deeds were to be

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

See id.
Chambers, 100 Minn. at 219, 110 N.W. at 1129-30.
Id.
Id.
Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 420.
Id. at 421.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2005

19

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 12
12WOLPERT.DOC

1152

3/13/2005 4:27:27 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:3

124

resolved in favor of the grantor landowners.
As a result, the
courts in this period tended to impose a “binary structure on
railroad title disputes,” either holding that the railroad acquired a
fee simple absolute and could do virtually anything it wanted with
its land or that the railroad acquired an easement extinguishable
125
under principles of abandonment.
Chambers’ observation that the property would revert
automatically to the grantor regardless of whether the deed created
an easement or a defeasible fee, coupled with the tendency of
courts in this era to construe deeds to railroads as either conveying
a fee simple absolute or an easement, led the Hess court to closely
scrutinize the questions addressed in Norton and Zahner. Although
the deeds at issue in Norton and Zahner appeared to be factually
similar to the deed in Hess, the court recognized that these
decisions would have limited precedential value in determining the
nature of the property interest conveyed to the railroad company
by the 1898 deed if the decisions followed the binary approach
typical of nineteenth century courts or failed to address whether
126
the deed at issue conveyed a defeasible fee or an easement.
The court in Hess determined that the question in both Zahner
and Norton was whether the deed to the railroad company granted
127
a fee simple absolute or an easement.
In Norton, the railroad
company charged with having abandoned an easement defended
itself on the grounds that it was not bound by use limitations
128
because it had acquired a fee simple absolute. “[T]he appellants
argued that the deed at issue ‘conveyed an absolute fee title limited
only as to use, namely, railroad right of way purposes, and that a
failure to use it for that purpose or at all would not terminate the
129
In Norton, the court held that the
absolute title thus granted.’”
conveyance of a strip of land to a railroad company for a right of
way conveyed an easement rather than an absolute title for which
130
the appellants argued. The Norton court did not address whether

124. Id. at 421 n.6.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 420-21 & n.6.
127. Id. at 420-21 (citing Norton, 129 Minn. at 129-31, 151 N.W. at 908; Zahner,
145 Minn. at 313, 177 N.W. at 350).
128. Norton, 129 Minn. at 129, 151 N.W. at 908.
129. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 420 (citing Norton, 129 Minn. at 129, 151 N.W. at
908).
130. Id. (quoting Norton, 129 Minn. at 129, 151 N.W. at 908).
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131

the deed constituted a fee simple determinable. The court stated
that its holding meant that “intentional abandonment of the
property operates to extinguish all rights of the grantee without
132
affirmative action on the part of the grantor.” The Hess court
explained, based on Chambers, that the distinction between an
easement and a fee simple determinable was not material to the
case since under both scenarios, abandonment would extinguish
133
the grantee’s interest in the right-of-way.
Similarly, Zahner addressed the question of whether the
grantors conveyed an easement or a fee estate. The railroad
company argued that it had acquired the land in fee and that the
successor in title to the grantor had no right of access to a right of
134
way that was conveyed outright in the granting clause.
As in
Norton, the Zahner court focused on the issue of reversionary rights
in justifying its holding and stated that “[w]ithin the principles of
our holdings there was no intent to grant a fee, but an intent to
grant a railroad right of way easement, which would revert upon
135
abandonment.”
The court in Hess explained that Zahner
addressed the question of whether the deed conveyed an easement
or a fee simple absolute and that the determinable fee option was
136
not addressed.
Furthermore, the court explained, based on
Chambers, that the distinction between an easement and a fee
simple determinable was not material to the resolution of the
137
case.
After discussing the precedential value of Norton and Zahner,
the Hess court went on to discuss the implications of the MTA for
138
its methodology of deed construction.
The MTA provides that
no action affecting the possession or title of real estate may be
commenced against a claim of title that has been of record for at
least forty years unless the adverse claimant has recorded a notice

131. Id.
132. Norton, 129 Minn. at 131, 151 N.W. at 908.
133. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 421 (“As we had recognized in Chambers, the interests
at issue would have reverted to the grantors upon the termination of their use
regardless of the distinction.”).
134. Chicago Great W. Ry. Co. v. Zahner, 145 Minn. 312, 312, 177 N.W. 350,
350 (1920).
135. Id. at 314, 177 N.W. at 350.
136. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 420-21 & n.6.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 422.
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of the adverse claim within that forty-year period.
In Hess, the
court recognized that the stated purpose of the MTA is “to prevent
restrictions on uses that have not been reasserted as a matter of
record within the last 40 years from ‘fetter[ing] the marketability of
140
title.’”
The court also stated that two of its previous decisions
recognized that the passage of the MTA was “‘a marked departure
from the policy and operation underlying our land transfer
141
system’” and represented “‘a new point of departure for the
142
process of judicial reasoning’ in real estate law.”
The court in Hess then explained that there were two reasons
why the MTA was significant for its analysis of the nature of the
143
interest conveyed by the 1898 deed.
First, the MTA now makes
the distinction between an easement and a fee simple determinable
material because an interest in fee simple determinable may be
144
subject to the MTA’s conclusive presumption of abandonment.
Second, the court stated that “public policy reasons behind the
[MTA], such as finality of conveyances and enforcing settled
expectations, should be considered in our framework for analyzing
the intent of the parties in a conveyance of land for right of way
145
purposes in a deed.” In a footnote, the court further elaborated
on the public policy interests that underlie the MTA by quoting
146
extensively from a law review article by Wright and Hestor.
In
those passages, Wright and Hestor explain that the pubic has an
interest in settled expectations and an interest in preserving
147
corridors for trails and utilities. Both of those interests are served
by finding fee title in the railroad and by abandoning common law
148
doctrines that narrow the scope of interests in railroad corridors.
According to Wright and Hestor, such an approach would further
the pubic policy of quieting title that underlies various property
doctrines and would be consistent with the expectation of

139. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 541.023, subd. 1 (2002)).
140. Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 541.023, subd. 5 (2002)).
141. Id. (quoting Hersh Props., LLC v. McDonald’s Corp., 588 N.W.2d 728,
734 (Minn. 1999)).
142. Id. (quoting Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 99, 83 N.W.2d 800, 812
(1957)).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at n.7 (quoting Wright & Hester, supra note 38, at 384-85).
147. Id. at 422.
148. Id.
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adjoining property owners that they not receive the windfall of a
149
rail corridor. In short, it is in the public interest to abandon the
150
century-old anti-railroad animus.
The Hess court’s conclusion that Norton and Zahner provided
limited guidance in evaluating the 1898 deed was crucial to its
ultimate holding for three reasons. First, it swept away the
foundations for the court of appeals’ conclusion that there was a
presumption that a conveyance to a railroad was an easement
151
rather than a defeasible fee.
The court of appeals had reviewed
Norton and Zahner and concluded that because the Minnesota
courts had never held that a conveyance to a railroad company was
a fee estate, the parties to the 1898 deed intended to convey an
152
easement.
This presumption, however, conflicted with the
supreme court’s longstanding rule that the intent of the grantor
153
determines that nature of the interest conveyed.
The supreme
court, by recognizing that the courts in Norton and Zahner were
evaluating whether the estate conveyed was an easement or a fee
simple absolute and that the distinction between a fee simple
determinable and an easement was not material to the outcome of
these cases, effectively distinguished Norton and Zahner from Hess
and, at the same time, exposed the court’s binary approach to deed
construction.
Second, the Hess court concluded that Norton and Zahner were
of limited precedential value in evaluating the nature of the
interest conveyed by the 1898 deed, which freed the court from the
binary analytical structure of the nineteenth century and its
underlying anti-railroad animus in a manner consistent with the
public policy objectives of the MTA. The binary approach to deed
construction reflected not only an anti-railroad animus, but the
doctrinal reality that the distinction between an easement and a fee
simple determinable was immaterial in giving effect to reversionary
154
rights. Once the MTA had been enacted, however, the Hess court
recognized that the distinction between an easement and a fee
simple determinable was now legally significant and that the stated
public policy objectives underlying the MTA were not served by

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 424 & n.8.
State v. Hess, 665 N.W.2d 560, 566 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 428-29.
See Wright & Hester, supra note 38, at 384-85.
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continuing to interpret deeds in a manner that reflected the
155
Indeed, the court
nineteenth century’s anti-railroad animus.
understood that finding fee title in the railroad would further the
MTA’s public policy of quieting title when there was little
“expectation on the part of the adjoining landowners to receive the
156
windfall of a rail corridor.” The court also understood that there
was no reason to continue the anti-railroad animus because finding
fee title in the railroad furthers the public interest in preserving
corridors for trails and utilities when landowners do not have title
to the corridor land, heirs of the grantor are long gone, and the
corridor can continue to “provide vital public utility, recreational,
157
environmental, and transportation services.”
By exposing the
doctrinal and historical underpinnings of Norton and Zahner and
contrasting them with the modern doctrinal and policy objectives
of the MTA, the court provided a compelling normative
justification for jettisoning Norton and Zahner’s binary structure and
fully restoring its longstanding methodology for interpreting deeds
based on the grantor’s intent.
Third, the Hess court’s conclusion that Norton and Zahner were
of limited precedent permitted the court to evaluate the nature of
the interest conveyed to the railroad company based on its
longstanding approach that the intent of the grantors determines
the nature and scope of the property interest conveyed. Indeed,
on numerous occasions the supreme court has stated that one
examines “the intent of the grantor, as expressed in the deed and
in light of the surrounding circumstances” in determining the
158
nature and scope of a conveyance.
In both Norton and Zahner,
the court stated that it would examine the intent of the parties as
expressed in the deed to evaluate whether the grantor conveyed a
159
fee interest or an easement.
Based on Hess, however, it is
apparent that the court believed that the intent of the grantor was
being evaluated under the confines of a legal doctrine and
historical animus towards railroads. Thus, the court in Hess
established an approach to deed construction that removed the
155. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 422.
156. Id. at 422 n.7 (quoting Wright & Hester, supra note 38, at 385-86).
157. Id. (quoting Wright & Hester, supra note 38, at 385-86).
158. Id. at 423 (citing Consol. School Dist. No. 102 v. Walter, 243 Minn. 159,
162, 66 N.W.2d 881, 883 (1954)).
159. Chi. Great W. Ry. Co. v. Zahner, 145 Minn. 312, 313-14, 177 N.W. 350,
350 (1920); Norton v. Duluth Transfer Ry. Co., 129 Minn. 126, 130-31, 151 N.W.
907, 908 (1915).
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constraints of the ancient legal doctrine and historical animus.
B. The Parties’ Intent
Against the backdrop of the MTA and its prior cases, the court
evaluated the nature of the interest conveyed to the railroad
company by examining the language of the deed to discern the
160
intent of the parties. The court noted that its construction would
be based on the entire deed rather than disjointed parts and that if
the deed’s language were ambiguous, it could consider evidence of
the surrounding circumstances and the situation of the parties to
161
shed light on the intent of the parties.
To determine the intent of the parties, the court then
examined the language of the granting clause, the use of the terms
“so long as” and “right of way” in the habendum clause, the
provision granting the railroad company permission to erect snow
162
Because the deed was
fences, and the release of dower rights.
ambiguous on the intent of the parties, the court also examined
163
extrinsic evidence.
Based on all of these factors, the court
concluded that the parties intended to convey a fee simple
164
determinable rather than an easement.
In doing so, the court first turned to the language of the
granting clause, which states that the grantors “hereby grant,
bargain, sell and convey unto the said company, its successors and
165
assigns, a strip, belt or piece of land.” The court determined that
the granting clause “expressly conveys land rather than mere use of
166
the land.”
The court then turned to the language of the habendum
clause, which states: “Provided that this Grant or Conveyance shall
continue in force, so long as the said strips of land shall be used for
Right of Way and for Railway purposes; but to cease and terminate
167
The court
if the Railway is removed from the said strips.”
160. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 423.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 424.
163. Id. at 425-26.
164. Id. at 426.
165. Id. at 423.
166. Id. The granting clause of the 1898 deed expressly transfers an interest in
land and does not include the term “right of way.” The granting clause generally
controls the determination of whether a fee title or easement is granted. See
Korpela, supra note 18, § 5(c) at 973.
167. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 423.
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determined “that the use of the phrase ‘so long as’ in the clause
provides clear evidence of the grantors’ intent to convey a
determinable fee because this phrase is typically used in a
168
conveyance of a fee simple determinable.”
The court also determined that the use of the term “right of
way” in the habendum clause did not provide evidence of the
parties’ intent as to the nature of the conveyance because the term
“right of way” has a dual meaning and because Minnesota law does
not presume that a conveyance of land to a railroad company for
169
“right of way” purposes is an easement.
The court first observed
that courts have long recognized that the term “right of way” is
ambiguous because it may be used to describe (1) “a right of
passage over any tract,” suggesting an easement, or (2) the “land
which railroad companies take upon which to construct their road170
bed, suggesting conveyance of a fee interest.”
Accordingly, the
use of the term “right of way” does not necessarily mean that the
171
The court then concluded that this
conveyance is an easement.
understanding of the dual nature of the term “right of way” is
consistent with Minnesota law, particularly the MTA, which
172
disfavors encumbrances on title.
In light of the MTA, the court

168. Id. at 424. Construction of the deed as a fee would give effect to the
defeasance clause in the habendum clause. If the deed intended to convey an
easement, no reversionary clause would be necessary because the abandonment of
the easement would automatically extinguish the easement even if the deed
contained no reversionary clause.
169. Id.
170. Id. (citing Bosell v. Rannestad, 226 Minn. 413, 418, 33 N.W.2d 40, 43-44
(1948)). Other courts have recognized the two meanings of “right of way” and
have concluded that the mere presence of the term “right of way” in a deed does
not by itself indicate an intent to convey an easement. See, e.g., King County v.
Rasmussen, 299 F.3d 1077, 1085 (9th Cir. 2002); Clark v. CSX Transp., Inc., 737
N.E.2d 752, 758 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); Brown v. State, 924 P.2d 908, 914 (Wash.
1996) (en banc). In addition, the fact that the term “right of way” is used in the
habendum clause does not mean that an easement was conveyed. In general, the
habendum clause “may explain, enlarge, or qualify, but cannot contradict or
defeat, the estate granted” in the granting clause. N.Y. Indians v. United States,
170 U.S. 1, 20 (1898).
171. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 424.
172. Id. Such a construction of the term “right of way” carries out the
underlying purpose of the MTA that outmoded restrictions on use that have not
been reasserted as a matter of record within the last forty years “not fetter the
marketability of real estate.” MINN. STAT. § 541.023, subd. 5 (2002). The
Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that this express legislative policy “should be
accepted as a new point of departure for the process of judicial reasoning.”
Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 98, 83 N.W.2d 800, 812 (1957).
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then stated that “[t]o the extent that Norton and Zahner could be
read to suggest that any conveyance of a right of way to a railroad is
173
an easement, they are no longer good law.” For all these reasons,
the court concluded that the use of the term “right of way” in the
habendum clause did not necessarily make the conveyance an
174
easement.
Next, the court described additional language in the 1898
deed that indicated the grantors’ intent to convey a fee simple
175
determinable.
The court highlighted language in the deed
conveying the 100-foot-wide corridor and separate language
describing the conveyance of four additional strips of land that
176
increase the width of the corridor up to 200 feet.
The court
observed that the deed uses different language for the grant of the
corridor and the grant of an easement to the railroad company to
erect snow fences up to 100 feet beyond the edges of the
177
corridor. The language regarding the snow fences used the term
178
“right” as opposed to the phrase “grant, bargain, sell and convey.”
Based on this different language used by the parties for the grant of
the corridor and the grant of the easement for snow fences, the
court concluded that the parties were aware of the distinction
between the conveyance of an easement and a fee simple
determinable and intended to convey an ownership interest in the
179
land rather than mere use of the land.
The court then pointed to additional language in the 1898
deed that shed light on the intent of the parties to convey a fee
180
estate: the deed contained a release of dower rights.
“‘Dower
rights’ are an interest that a wife has in the real estate of her
181
husband.” The release provides: “And the said Harriet G. Walker
and Hattie F. Akeley hereby relinquish their right of dower in the
182
tracts hereby conveyed.”
An easement is not title to the land and can be conveyed

173. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 424 n.8.
174. Id. at 425.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. (citing Stitt v. Smith, 102 Minn. 253, 254, 113 N.W. 632, 633 (1907)).
182. Id. at 417. According to the court, the words “Hattie F. Akeley” and
“relinquish” were illegible. Id. n.2.
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183

without the relinquishment of the wife’s dower rights. The court
noted that the presence in a deed to a railroad of language
releasing dower rights, while not dispositive, provides evidence of
184
an intent to convey a fee interest rather than an easement.
Finally, the court noted that because the 1898 deed was
ambiguous about the intent of the parties regarding the nature of
the interest conveyed, it could look to extrinsic evidence of the
surrounding circumstances of the parties in relation to the
185
conveyance, such as the subsequent conduct of the parties.
On
June 17, 1901, W.T. Joyce and Clotilde G. Joyce, grantors of the
1898 deed, conveyed by deed their interest in certain land adjacent
186
to the railway corridor created by the 1898 deed. The 1901 deed
to Akeley described the land conveyed and then provided:
“Excepting and reserving there from the land heretobefore
conveyed to the Park Rapids and Leech Lake Railway and to the
187
Brainerd and Northern Minnesota Railway for right-of-way.”
When the term “excepting” is used in a deed, it typically
188
indicates that nothing passes.
A conveyance referring to a
preexisting easement typically indicates that the conveyance is
189
“subject to” the easement. Accordingly, the court concluded that
the 1901 deed provided additional support that the parties to the
1898 deed intended to convey a fee simple determinable rather
190
than an easement.
In sum, the court concluded that the language of the granting
clause, the use of the terms “so long as” in the habendum clause,
the provision granting the railroad company permission to erect
snow fences, the release of dower rights, and the language of the
183. Id. at 425 (citing Chicago & S.W. R.R. Co. v. Swinney, 38 Iowa 182, 182
(1874); 28 C.J.S. Dower and Curtesy § 12 (1996)).
184. Id.; see also Brewer & Taylor Co. v. Wall, 769 S.W.2d 753, 755 (Ark. 1989);
Coleman v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 745 S.W.2d 622, 624 (Ark. 1988); Elton Schmidt &
Sons Farm Co. v. Kneib, 507 N.W.2d 305, 309 (Neb. Ct. App. 1993). But see Hawk
v. Rice, 325 N.W.2d 97, 100 (Iowa 1982) (holding that granting clause indicated
conveyance of easement despite the release of dower in the deed).
185. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 425-26.
186. Id. at 426.
187. Id.
188. Id. (citing Carlson v. Duluth Short Line Ry. Co., 38 Minn. 305, 306, 37
N.W. 341, 341 (1888)); see also King County v. Rasmussen, 299 F.3d 1077, 1087
(9th Cir. 2002) (“By excepting the right of way . . . the [subsequent] conveyances
betray an understanding that the Railway owned the strip of land and did not
merely have a right to enter the strip.”).
189. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 426.
190. Id.
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1901 deed all indicated that the parties intended to convey a fee
191
simple determinable. The court noted that this conclusion “best
192
serves many of the policy reasons underlying the [MTA].”
Because the railroad acquired a fee simple determinable in the
193
1898 deed, the grantors retained only the possibility of a reverter.
The court went on to hold, however, that this future interest was
extinguished under the MTA because it was not periodically
194
recorded by the grantors’ successors.
Accordingly, the railroad’s
defeasible fee interest had long ago ripened into a fee simple
195
absolute and the state owned the land in fee simple absolute.
V. CONCLUSION
In Hess, the Minnesota Supreme Court followed the public
policy objectives of the legislature in the MTA and (1) refused to
create a presumption that a conveyance of a right of way to a
railroad company is an easement rather than a defeasible fee and
(2) extricated itself from prior case law that reflected an anti196
railroad animus and a binary structure of deed interpretation. In
doing so, the court fully embraced its longstanding methodology of
deed interpretation that the intent of the parties determines the
nature of the conveyance and established a strong legal and policy
foundation protecting the past and future conversion of rail
197
corridors into recreational trails.
The court’s decision in Hess
means that future challenges to recreational trails owned by the
state cannot rely on a presumption that the original conveyance
was an easement. Rather, abutting property owners will have to
demonstrate that the parties to an ancient deed intended to convey
an easement in order to challenge a rails-to-trails conversion. Hess
is a clear signal to trail opponents that Minnesota’s public interest
supports interpreting deeds to railroads as conveying fee estates
rather than easements. For all these reasons, Hess reassures the
state that it owns its recreational trails, promotes the public
interest, and avoids plunging the state into a costly parcel by parcel
battle to save its recreational trails.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 427.
Id.
Id. at 424.
Id.
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